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DIFFERENTIATED REGULATION: THE CASE OF CHARITIES 
 
Abstract 
The increasing number and influence of charities in the economy, evidence of mismanagement, and 
the need for information for policy-making, are all reasons for establishing charity regulators. Public 
interest and public choice theories explain charity regulation which aims to increase public trust and 
confidence in charities (and thus increase voluntarism and philanthropy), and to limit tax benefits to 
specific organisations and donors. Nevertheless, regulation is resource intensive, and growing 
pressure on government budgets requires efficiencies to be found. This paper proposes regulation 
differentiated according to charities’ main resource providers, to reduce costs and focus regulatory 
effort, and provides a feasible segmentation. 
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DIFFERENTIATED REGULATION: THE CASE OF CHARITIES 
1. Introduction 
In response to “scandals and doubts about public trust and confidence” (Connolly & Hyndman, 
2013, p. 946), there have been calls for greater accountability and transparency from organisations 
formed for the public benefit. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have recently established charity 
regulators (for example, New Zealand’s Charities Commission and Singapore’s Commissioner of 
Charities in 2006, the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland in 2010, and the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) in 2012).1 Some calls for regulation are also from those 
concerned that public policy would otherwise be undertaken in a vacuum, due to a lack of knowledge 
about the size and reach of the charitable sector (for example, Ferguson, 2005; Lyons, 2001). 
This research focuses on regulation designed to increase the accountability and transparency 
of organizations that are defined in law as charities, in particular through requiring financial reporting.2 
In many jurisdictions, there are specific benefits available to registered charities, including exemption 
from taxation on income (specifically surpluses), reduced state and local taxes, preferential access to 
government and philanthropic funds, and taxation concessions for donors (Abramson, Salamon, & 
Steurle, 2006; Breen, Ford, & Morgan, 2009; Smith, 2012). Governments have good reason to support 
charities and philanthropists, as these actors can reduce the burden on state funds, increase 
community resilience, and encourage civil society (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011; Mayer & Wilson, 
2010; Salamon, 1990). Nevertheless, governments also regulate to restrict the organizations that can 
continue to avail themselves of these taxation and other benefits, to those whose purposes and 
activities would maximise governments’ policy goals and, note Desai and Yetman (2005), to reduce 
abuse of the tax-exempt status. In addition, given the reports of staff acting opportunistically with 
governments’ and donors’ funds, and inaccurate reporting or manipulation of financial disclosures 
(Desai & Yetman, 2005; Gibelman & Gelman, 2004; Hofmann & McSwain, 2013; Leone & Van Horn, 
2005; Phillips, 2013; Sinclair, Northcott, & Hooper, 2014; Yetman & Yetman, 2012), calls for increased 
regulation are unsurprising. Various regulatory practices (including publication of financial 
statements) may increase public trust and confidence in this sector; and potentially increase donations 
of time and money (philanthropy) (Breen, 2009; Keating & Frumkin, 2003).  
                                                          
1  As further noted, the New Zealand Charities Commission has undergone modification since its establishment 
and the ACNC (Repeal) (No.1) Bill (2014) signals the demise of that regulator (Saj, 2014) 
2  Some regulators (for example, New Zealand) make the financial statements publically available (and in the 
US, a shortened form (Form 990) can be accessed by the public) (Phillips, 2013). 
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Yet, the economic downturn from 2009 and general pressure on government budgets has 
forced charity regulators to cut costs (Mayer & Wilson, 2010) and find efficiencies. Further, regulatory 
burden (‘red tape’) on charities is the reason cited for the demise of the Australian ACNC as that 
government tries to reduce compliance costs (Australian Government Department of Social Services, 
2014).3 However, the need for regulation requiring greater levels of disclosure and transparency by 
charities is self-evident, due to significant government and public support of charities, the levels of 
fraud and earnings manipulation in the charitable sector (Desai & Yetman, 2005; Hofmann & McSwain, 
2013; Leone & Van Horn, 2005; Sinclair et al., 2014; Yetman & Yetman, 2012) and the effect of public 
policy on the charitable sector (and vice-versa). While self-reporting/self-regulation is one way to 
reduce regulatory burden, nevertheless low levels of compliance make this tactic unlikely to increase 
regulatory efficiency (Australian Government Department of Social Services, 2014). Co-regulation has 
had some success in Canada (Phillips, 2013), although innovative approaches are few and far between 
in the charitable regulation space.  
Thus a conundrum presents itself – how can we increase public trust and confidence in the 
charity sector by efficient accountability and transparency? At a time when public scrutiny and 
demands for accountability and transparency are increasing, developing efficient regulatory options 
for this sector is especially necessary (Ferguson, 2005; Gaskin, 1999; Gibelman & Gelman, 2004; 
Phillips, 2013; Saj, 2014). It is the objective of this paper to present a case for differentiated regulation 
as one step towards meeting these demands. This case is underpinned by theories that explain the 
rise of the charitable sector, rationales for regulation, and close analysis of empirical data to support 
the argument.  
This research asks: how can the population of registered charities be segmented to reduce the 
cost (and impost) of regulation as a step towards greater regulatory efficiency? New Zealand data 
utilised in this research supports the proposition that not all of the charities registering with their 
regulator in order to avail themselves of benefits require government oversight, as their primary 
resource providers (principals) are in a position to exercise oversight responsibilities of these charities 
(agents). We posit that, instead of spreading reduced regulatory resources ever-more thinly, 
differentiated regulation provides a useful strategy for charity regulators to focus regulatory effort, 
increase effectiveness and reduce costs. Differentiated regulation requires an effective segmentation 
of charities according to their main resource providers (i.e. the stakeholders who are likely to be most 
interested in their performance) with registration only for those charities whose members/close 
                                                          
3  Yet, Saj (2014) notes the political motivation behind this, in that the majority of submissions were against 
closing the ACNC’s operations, but the government is pressing ahead.  
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stakeholders provide the majority of resources, and regulation with closer monitoring for those whose 
main resource providers are “the public”, that is, who are diverse and for whom the costs of 
monitoring are high (Williams, 1984). In this research, we demonstrate (using cluster analysis) that 
such segmentation can be achieved, and that regulation could benefit from such an approach. Such 
differentiation upholds specific economic theories explaining why these organisations form and 
operate. Accordingly, the paper adds to the literature through exploring an option for regulation that 
is supported by theory, and is underpinned by an imperative of transparent reporting and disclosure. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss theories explaining 
why charities form and operate. In section 3 we review the arguments for regulation and introduce 
differentiated regulation in section 4. In section 5 we present our empirical analysis to demonstrate 
the feasibility of segmenting charities consistent with differentiated regulation. Section 6 concludes 
the paper with discussion of our results and identification of opportunities for further research. 
2. The Charities Sector  
The rise of charity regulators is related to the increasing number and reach of nonprofit organizations 
in general and charities in particular,4 especially as governments increasingly contract with charities 
to deliver social services (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011; Mayer & Wilson, 2010). This section overviews 
the major economic theories describing why charities emerge and therefore who their main resource 
providers will be. These are: market failure, government failure, voluntary failure, and contracting for 
‘trust goods’.5 In the last part of this section, we highlight the strident calls for regulating these 
organizations.   
2.1 Some theories explaining the rise of the sector 
Market failure and government failure can explain why organizations form which deliver 
public/ collective goods and services and do not distribute profits to owners. These organizations are 
likely to receive funds from donors, governments and, to a lesser extent, payment from service 
recipients. 
Rose-Ackerman (1986) argues that market failure occurs when goods can be delivered at a 
lower net cost (after the cost of contracting) by nonprofit rather than for-profit organizations. This will 
                                                          
4  Economic theories refer to nonprofit organizations in general, but this paper focuses on organizations 
defined in jurisdictions as charities, a subset of the nonprofit sector.  
5  We recognize that other theories have been devised to explain the relationship between the nonprofit sector 
and government (for example, social origins theory and interdependence as in Salamon, 1990, 1995), and 
also the rise of social entrepreneurs as differentiated from business entrepreneurs (Young & Grinsfelder, 
2006). Nevertheless, the paper uses four main economic theories in this preliminary analysis.  
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occur when the nonprofit organization is prepared to earn less than the cost of capital, and/or draw 
on voluntary labour donations. Nonprofit providers cater to those who cannot afford to pay the 
market price and thus can supplement the work of for-profit providers who will service only those 
clients who can and are willing to pay the market price.6 They will seek funding from donations 
(including bequests and sponsorships) and, because market failure also occurs in relation to the 
provision of public or collective goods, government will also be a major resource provider. In respect 
of public goods, for-profit organizations are not inclined to deliver these goods owing to free-riders. 
Government can reduce such market failure through taxes and incentives to encourage service 
provision by others (Weisbrod, 1988, 1989).   
While governments may use taxes and incentives to remedy market failure, nevertheless, 
when government is forced to step in as a provider or major funder, the services it supplies tend to be 
homogeneous, not cognisant of diversity in communities, and hence government failure can occur.7 
Nonprofit organizations emerge to reduce government failure by meeting the diverse needs of specific 
(heterogeneous) communities (Weisbrod, 1989), drawing on resources from government, donations, 
bequests and sponsorships.  
The extent to which nonprofit organizations can continue to operate depends on such 
external funding and, without sufficient patronage or government support, they will fail (Salamon, 
1987 terms this “voluntary failure”). Studies utilising this theory include Sutton, Baskerville and 
Cordery (2010) who analysed the failure of a national charity as it lost legitimacy with the donating 
public and government. Robbins and Lapsley (2008) also utilised the theory to analyse voluntary 
failure in the Irish hospital charitable sector, citing the reduction in resourcing as inflation impacted 
endowment funds, donations fell and costs rose.  
A further reason for the rise of nonprofit organisations is provided by Ben-Ner (1986). When 
information asymmetry limits consumers’ ability to assess service quality, they are more likely to form 
their own organizations to ensure quality, or transact for these ‘trust goods’ with a nonprofit 
organization (Ben-Ner, 1986; Hansmann, 1986). Trust good transactions include, for example, when 
an adult child commits their parent with dementia to an aged care facility. Here, they cannot observe 
the quality of care, nor may the parent be able to adequately inform them. In these and similar 
situations, member management of nonprofit member-based organizations signals that the services 
can be obtained at a cost and quality that the members prefer (Cleveland & Krashinsky, 2009). Further, 
                                                          
6  For example, for-profit organizations ‘cream-skimming’ or servicing clients that present simple, profitable 
cases is a problem endemic in health care. 
7  That is, government fails to deliver public or collective goods that match demand. 
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Cleveland and Krashinsky (2009) show that, in well-developed markets, these nonprofit providers also 
provide higher quality care than for-profit providers. While they may be effective, yet Weisbrod (1989) 
notes that these organizations’ managers have less incentive to be efficient than managers in for-
profit businesses, therefore they require greater monitoring of their financial and social performance. 
The main resource providers – members who have formed and who fund the organisation – are best 
placed to undertake such monitoring (Cleveland & Krashinsky, 2009). 
From this brief explanation of market failure, government failure, voluntary failure and trust goods 
(theories which are well described in the literature), government support is now presented. 
 2.2 Support through taxation relief 
In addition to providing services in basic areas, such as health and social services, the charity 
sector includes organizations that enrich cultural diversity within society (for example, arts 
organizations), contribute to the community (for example, environmental organizations) and in so 
doing, develop social capital within communities (Bryce, 2005). Governments must decide which of 
these non-market additions to public and collective goods they should support and how. 
Fries (2003, p. 8) notes that charities provide opportunities for “citizens to contribute to the 
public good on their own initiative”. Citizens may offer funds, voluntary labour, labour at a reduced 
cost, or donate goods, thus enabling a nonprofit organization to reduce its service costs (James, 1987). 
When government is also a funder of these goods, it will also seek to encourage philanthropy and thus 
reduce demands on it to provide more funding. Philanthropy should grow when there is increased 
public trust and confidence in these charities (Williams, 1984), which can occur through the provision 
of financial reports (Gordon & Khumawala, 1999; Sinclair et al., 2014). 
A major tax benefit often extended to charities is an income tax exemption on surpluses from 
trading activities and income from investments. Some argue that tax-exempt bodies potentially enjoy 
a competitive advantage over for-profit businesses; this advantage is further extended if they use 
volunteers to deliver goods and services (Dalton & Casey, 2008).8 Yet, nonprofit trading concerns could 
be disadvantaged by their limited access to finance and credit compared to for-profit and public sector 
organizations. Further, a lack of horizontal equity exists between the nonprofit, for-profit and public 
sectors, as nonprofit public sector organizations are both tax-exempt and also potentially have better 
access to credit and finance. While the Australian Productivity Commission (2010) argued there was 
no benefit in organizational type when there is an aim to maximise surplus, nevertheless income tax 
                                                          
8  This could be deemed unfair competition; nevertheless, the argument is void if there are no for-profit 
participants (as occurs when market failure is present). 
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exemption is often viewed as appropriate for nonprofit organizations with a public benefit intent 
rather than profit maximization.  
 2.3 Calls for regulation 
Financial and governance scandals have seen increasing calls for charity regulation (Ferguson, 
2005; Gaskin, 1999; Productivity Commission, 2010). For example, wrongdoing in charities includes 
theft, misconduct, excessive compensation, and mismanagement of resources (Desai & Yetman, 2005; 
Gibelman & Gelman, 2004; Hofmann & McSwain, 2013; Leone & Van Horn, 2005). It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that declining public confidence in charities (due in part to such scandals) has led to calls 
for enhanced charity accountability and regulation (Gaskin, 1999; Gibelman & Gelman, 2004).  
Due to the sensitivity of such scandals, regulators have responded by increasing the regulatory 
scrutiny of the charity sector, including requiring charities to produce financial reports if they are to 
enjoy taxation concessions and other benefits (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). Nevertheless, the disparity in 
charity size is one factor that makes regulation of charities a ‘complex problem’ (Mayer & Wilson, 
2010). For example, Mayer and Wilson (2010) and Palmer (2013) note that regulatory disclosure may 
be burdensome for small charities (compliance costs were a strong argument against the ACNC, Saj, 
2014). Enforcement barriers are a further issue; including regulators’ constrained resources (Mayer & 
Wilson, 2010). Design of the appropriate form of regulation is therefore challenging.  
3. Arguments for Charity Regulation  
The number of theories of regulation and the fact that the need and imposition of regulation 
is both contextually and temporally specific, make discussions of regulation complex. While neo-
classical theorists discourage public regulatory intervention, the recognition that markets are not 
perfectly efficient has given rise to two rationales for regulation - public interest (as argued by Stigler, 
1971), and public choice theory (as argued for by Peltzman, 1976). 
The public interest theory of regulation asserts that regulation is necessary to deal effectively 
with substantive resource distribution problems (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). Public interest theory 
argues that business operations prefer their private interests rather than the public interest and that, 
due to information asymmetry, regulation is needed to protect the public interest. This theory 
specifically acknowledges market failure (Chalmers, Godfrey, & Lynch, 2012). Regulation may be used 
to reduce the likelihood that a monopoly will under-provide a good or service. A regulator may also 
facilitate activities to address information asymmetries and assist fair distribution of resources 
(Williams, 1984). In the charity case, for example, a fundraising regulator may monitor whether these 
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donations are applied appropriately to a charitable purpose and thus, improve confidence in the 
‘donor market’ (Breen, 2009; Cordery, 2013). 
Public interest theory suggests that government may also regulate to restrict entry to ensure 
public safety and quality, often building (or supporting) a market to efficiently establish prices and 
quality (as could happen for a donor market) (Chalmers et al., 2012; Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; 
Stigler, 1971). Mechanisms for evicting or punishing miscreants are also tools of restrictive entry 
regulation and (as can be seen in the charity space) much effort of new regulators is applied to 
registration and compliance with entry restrictions. Regulation mandating organizational disclosure of 
specific items (especially financial statements), is less interventionist than regulation that restricts 
entry to a particular market, and is a common policy tool (Breen, 2013; Solomons, 1978). Financial 
reporting regulation within the securities markets originated as a reaction to insufficient voluntary 
disclosure to maintain an internationally efficient marketplace (Solomons, 1978). By restricting 
incentives and opportunities for reporting manipulation, regulators aim to restore market confidence, 
encourage investor participation, and improve issuers’ governance (Solomons, 1978). Such regulation 
for disclosure is likely to be in the public interest, but will require regulated organizations to collect 
and process new information, increase information dissemination and accept assurance costs. Charity 
regulators take a similar approach, but often reduce the reporting burden on smaller charities in 
recognition of those costs (Cordery, 2013) (see also Table 1). 
Public choice theory asserts that most regulation is merely a tool for addressing perceived 
problems, and that often the promise of regulation serving the public interest is not realised. This is 
due to rational ignorance, the self-interest of the politicians and public servants who regulate, and the 
possibility of regulatory capture (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). Peltzman (1976) notes that rational 
regulators will seek to maximize political returns, rather than purely economic returns. Extrapolating 
this argument to the charities sector suggests that charity regulation may be perceived as “good” 
politically, especially when government financially supports charities, but such regulation could 
increase charities’ costs and change resource flows without necessarily increasing donors’ trust and 
confidence. Therefore, public choice highlights the necessity for regulatory efficiency so that 
regulatory costs do not exceed benefits. Regulators need adequate funding, if both their law-making 
and enforcement roles are to be effective.  
“Governments regulate charities in a variety of ways and through a variety of government 
agencies” (Mayer & Wilson, 2010, p. 689). This is true of fundraising (for example, Breen, 2009) as well 
as organizational regulation, which is the subject of this article. For example, the United States (US) 
regulator is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), as is the tax department in Canada. However, in 
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England and Wales, the regulator is an independent organization, while in other countries it is within 
another government department (See Table 1). This is a structural decision which may be informed by 
the theoretical motivation to regulate, but also by historic structures in particular countries (for 
example, Irvine & Ryan, 2013).  
Government regulators frequently require charities to register, file returns, and be subject to 
audit on a random basis (as presaged by Solomons, 1978). Further, some regulators choose to respond 
to complaints from the public through audits and enquiries. However, recent reports show that the 
US regulator, the IRS, examined merely 1.36% of returns from tax-exempt organizations in 2011 (ten 
years earlier it was as low as 0.29%), while the Charity Commission of England and Wales reported an 
audit rate of 0.33% (Breen, 2013). Since then, budget cuts have forced a re-assessment of regulatory 
activity. Yet Simon (1995) notes that, when charity regulators limit their audit activity in order to 
reduce regulatory costs, non-compliance rises. As an example of the costs of regulation, Table 1 shows 
a summary of the cost data from seven different countries that currently operate a charities regulator.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 shows that the costs of emergent regulators (e.g. Australia) is high due to their 
establishment phase, while the regulators in England and Wales, New Zealand and Scotland operate 
on US$192-208 per registered charity.9 Nevertheless, all have suffered budget cuts. To respond to 
shrinking government budgets, Mayer and Wilson (2010, p. 527) suggest that “options that look 
instead to self-regulation by charities or their supporters are therefore attractive”.  Philips (2013) 
suggests ‘polycentric’ regulation, so government regulation is augmented by the potential oversight 
of self-regulation, or third parties which publish ratings or other data for donors. She notes in the 
Canadian context, that such a move has been marked by politicization of the regulation, but that a 
sector-based certification tool has potential.  
Freeman (1984) agreed that stakeholder management can reduce the need for government 
regulatory activity, and Phillips (2013) argues this should increase the public availability of 
information. Nevertheless, private individuals (stakeholders) may lack “standing” (the legal ability to 
challenge charities through the courts) and be unable to manage if a regulator was unable or unwilling 
to act (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). Only members of charities and trustees or directors who have legal 
standing could be expected to regulate the charity directly (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). From the theory 
                                                          
9  Table 1 compares the direct costs of each regulator as disclosed, but it is recognized that these will differ due 
to the breadth of each regulator’s responsibilities, the stage of its development and also undisclosed indirect 
costs. 
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analysed above, members were identified as having a particular interest in the charities they establish 
and support (Ben-Ner, 1986; Weisbrod, 1989). How, therefore, can regulatory reform draw on such 
legally empowered parties to increase efficiency? 
4. Differentiated Regulation  
Regulatory reform is a key aspect of New Public Management, with early reformers seeking 
to ‘roll back the state’ and, more recently, to ensure better regulation (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). 
This has also led to new means of regulation: using different institutional frameworks and alternative 
regulatory practices (Hansen & Pedersen, 2005). These alternatives to traditional approaches include 
co-regulation and self-regulation (as found in Canada in Phillips, 2013), targeted taxes, and 
differentiated regulation (Hansen & Pedersen, 2005). An example of the latter is the regulators seeking 
to introduce higher standards for buildings or carbon emission differentiating between new buildings 
or vehicles and old ones through taxes, standards or disclosure regulations. Vintage-differentiated 
regulation (grandfathering) holds newly constructed facilities and vehicles to a higher quality than pre-
existing facilities (Gruenspecht, 1982; Stavin, 2006).10  
Differentiated regulation may be observed in disclosure exemptions for smaller charities, for 
example in England and Wales and in Australia (see Table 1). In respect of ownership type and resource 
providers, New Zealand provides an example of differentiated regulation, as for-profit electricity 
distribution businesses are required to report against specific price and quality metrics to the 
regulator, and yet consumer-owned electricity distribution businesses are exempt from this regulatory 
reporting (Commerce Act, 1986 s.54D). This exemption from reporting is provided due to the ability 
of consumer-owners to monitor the prices and quality of their own electricity distribution business in 
the manner described by Ben-Ner (1986) in respect of trust goods. 
Thus, differentiated regulation allows government to scan the field and require regulation of 
a selection of organizations, or to regulate some participants differently from others. This occurs in 
the example of the electricity industry in New Zealand, or as can be seen in Table 1 in England and 
Wales where some charities are excepted and some exempted, and in a number of jurisdictions where 
smaller charities are not required to file financial statements. In the charities space, joint monitoring 
by both regulators and stakeholders may be an option (Breen, 2009; Phillips, 2013). For example, it is 
                                                          
10  Differentiated regulation may also be used to open a market (to reduce a cartel and therefore as the 
antithesis of entry restriction) and is often used in the telecommunication and electricity industries to 
encourage greater competition (Peitz, 2005). Here, an asymmetry between operators with significant market 
power and those without is recognised by forcing major market players to provide newcomers with access 
to a network at prices the regulator sets, to increase access and competition (Peitz, 2005).  
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suggested that charities relying on grants and/or donations from the general public (stakeholders) are 
more likely to file their financial statements with the regulator earlier (Reheul, Caneghem, & 
Verbruggen, 2014) and to subject their financial statements to audit (Kitching, 2009). While Weisbrod 
and Dominguez (1986) and Posnett and Sandler (1989) found that significant donors do analyse 
financial statements before donating, nevertheless Verbruggen, Christiaens and Milis (2011) argue 
that donors may not be as interested in financial reporting as a government funder, raising questions 
as to the ability of a diverse public donor group (who is not legally empowered) to monitor effectively.  
If the costs of regulation are high, but there is no improvement in public trust and confidence, 
then it may be well-intentioned (consistent with public interest) but ineffective, or simply be a tool to 
promote the interests of politicians/regulators without necessarily being intended to be effective (as 
argued by public choice theory). In either case, tools to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation should be considered. We propose differentiated regulation as an effective measure. This 
could be a differentiation along similar lines to New Zealand’s electricity redistributors (with lower 
levels of reporting) or by requiring certification (self-regulation) or third party rating systems (as 
outlined by Phillips, 2013).11 The particular choice of differentiation would be context-dependent.  
While charity regulators most commonly differentiate regulation according to charity size (see 
Table 1), we hypothesize instead that the beneficial effects of regulation (for example, on public trust 
and confidence) will be experienced by some charities more than others. These will be the charities 
that are funded mainly by public donations (and arise to combat market failure as argued by Rose-
Ackerman, 1986) and/or charities that receive funds for social services delivery (and arise to combat 
government failure as argued by Weisbrod, 1988). Further, as noted by Gordon and Khumawala 
(1999), donors that are distant from the charity (i.e. the public) are more likely to require financial 
statements before making a donation. We expect that charities with close donors will benefit from 
monitoring by their major resource providers – these may be member organizations with member 
managers (including deliverers of trust goods as argued by Ben-Ner, 1986; Cleveland & Krashinsky, 
2009), and those where voluntary trustees manage the charity (such as philanthropists who seek to 
redistribute wealth, or providers of infrastructure to communities and other nonprofit organizations). 
For these latter, the argument that trustees should monitor the charity is related not only to the 
reason for its establishment, but also the standing of trustees as relevant stakeholders.  
                                                          
11  As outlined by Kitching (2009), it is the larger charities that are followed by rating agencies, so this tactic is 
not suitable for the whole charities market. 
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The following section describes an empirical study on New Zealand data which demonstrates the 
feasibility of segmentation and hence the practicality of differentiated regulation.  
5. Empirical Study  
 5.1 Context, costs and confidence 
The data used in this research is from the register of the New Zealand Charities Commission 
which was established as an independent Crown Entity in 2005 to accept registrations from 1 July 
2007. At the time of the data collection in 2012, the Charities Commission had reached a ‘normal 
phase’ of operation following its start-up and registration of charities. However, the Commission 
subsequently was transferred into a government department and is now known as Charities Services. 
The regulator experienced a prolonged gestation. Concern had been expressed that organizations 
were being structured as charities in order to utilise tax benefits for tax avoidance, and various bodies 
recommended that a new regulator be established to register and monitor charities (these included: 
New Zealand Working Party on Charities and Sporting Bodies, 1989; Newell, 1997; Working Party on 
Registration Reporting and Monitoring of Charities, 2002). Furthermore, the lack of knowledge about 
the extent of government support to charities provided a strong impetus to charity regulation, as little 
data existed on charities’ incomes and the levels of donations made to them (Slack & Leung-Wai, 
2007). Such information had the potential to be useful for policy-making as well as to restrict entry to 
charity-specific (tax) benefits.   
The Charities Act 2005 enshrined in New Zealand Law the public benefit requirement and four 
heads of charity classified by Lord McNaughton in the well-known “Pemsel case” of 1891 (The 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. John Frederick Pemsel). This case has been 
foundational in decisions on appropriate charitable purposes and exemption from income tax in 
England and Wales (Gousmett, 2009) as well as New Zealand. The main purposes that define a charity 
are: the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion, or other 
purposes beneficial to the community (Charities Act, 2005 2012 s.5(1)) with the overriding purpose of 
being in the public interest required to be demonstrated before the charity is able to register and 
receive the benefits thereof. 
Following the register’s establishment, the number of registered charities grew steadily to 
27,000 as at 2013.12 Each charity is required to annually complete a standard format financial 
                                                          
12  All of these charities were automatically donee organizations. The cap on the donor rebates was removed in 
2008 thus increasing rebates to a maximum of the tax paid by the donor (the rebate being a third of the 
donation, no matter the taxpayer’s tax bracket). 
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questionnaire and to file their financial statements for full information. They are also required to 
provide details of the charity’s officers and other statistical information. The Charities Commission was 
established at a time of financial reporting change in New Zealand. As noted by Griffin, Lont and Sun 
(2009), the Accounting Standards Review Board required organizations to adopt NZ IFRS for reporting 
periods on or after 1 January 2007, and this included public sector and not-for-profit organizations as 
well as listed companies. Nevertheless, Release 9 (issued by the Accounting Standards Review Board, 
2007) reduced the impost on small and medium-sized entities. While this exemption gave rise to 
various standards being used by those filing financial statements (rather than to follow a standard 
account format as in some jurisdictions), the requirement to file is universal (Sinclair et al., 2014).  
The cost of this regulatory regime comprises the direct costs of the regulator, the compliance 
costs for the registered charities, and the welfare costs associated with the change in resource 
allocation resulting from operation of the regime.13 We have no information on the latter categories 
of costs but the on-going costs of the regulator are US$192 per registered charity as shown in Table 1. 
In addition to the registration process, the regulator carried out 634 investigations in 2011 (2.8% of 
registered charities) and 360 investigations in 2012 (1.48% of registered charities) (Charities 
Commission, 2012) largely in response to complaints and referrals. In both years, more than 100 
investigations remained uncompleted at year end.  
It is unclear whether philanthropy has increased since the regulator has been established, 
however donation rebates to individuals have almost doubled from NZ$119 million in 2005 (Slack & 
Leung-Wai, 2007) to NZ$203 million in 2011,14 following the removal of the tax-cap on donation 
rebates which was likely to result in more participants in the ‘donor market’. However, bi-annual 
surveys of public trust and confidence in charities evidence a decline in trust in charities – from a mean 
of 6.6 (out of 10) in 2008 to a mean of 6.0 in 2014 (Horizon Research, 2014).  
In addition to donations, charities receive significant funds from government departments in 
the way of contracts and grants (these totalled NZ$1.25 billion in 2006 against total government 
expenditure of NZ$54.2 billion, (Department of Internal Affairs, 2007). (Total contracts and grants are 
likely to be higher, as this figure did not include second tier payments.) The data indicate that the 
significant government resources flowing into the sector by way of donation rebates and contracting 
                                                          
13  Charities pay NZ$51.11 per annum if they file their annual statements and updates on line and NZ$75.67 if 
they send in a paper version of updates and annual accounts (amounts ex-Goods and Services Tax). Charities 
with income of less than NZ$10,000 pay no annual return fee.  
14  2011 information downloaded from http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-stats/revenue-refunds/ 
donations-rebates/ 1 December 2013. 
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make it important to ensure efficient regulation. In the smaller charity sample, revenues ranged from 
nil to NZ$5,329,334, assets from nil to NZ$8,305,951 and liabilities from nil to NZ$1,655,338.  In the 
medium-sized charity sample (with higher expenditures), revenues ranged from nil to NZ$5,152,748, 
assets from nil to NZ$25,156,933 liabilities from nil to NZ$13,584,493.   
We now turn to the question of whether the charities can be segmented into different ‘types’, for 
example, those funded mainly by donations (and arise to combat market failure as argued by Rose-
Ackerman, 1986), charities that receive funds for social services delivery (and arise to combat 
government failure as argued by Weisbrod, 1988), member organizations with member managers 
(including deliverers of trust goods as argued by Ben-Ner, 1986), those managed by trustees, such as 
philanthropists who seek to redistribute wealth, and providers of infrastructure to communities and 
other nonprofit organizations.  
 5.2 Analysis of “Types” of Registered Charities 
Market failure and government failure theories suggest that donative and social services 
charities are most likely to register with a regulator to receive tax benefits (see Rose-Ackerman, 1986; 
Weisbrod, 1988, 1989) and yet others may register as well, adding additional regulatory costs in a 
constrained environment. We used data from the New Zealand Charities’ Register to determine 
whether, on the basis of revenue sources, the charities separated into different “types” which could 
be described based on their revenue, expenditures, assets and liabilities. We further were interested 
in whether or not any of these “types” could be called donative (as per Rose-Ackerman, 1986), social 
service charities (as per Weisbrod, 1988), membership charities (as per Ben-Ner, 1986), 
philanthropists seeking to re-distribute wealth, or providers of infrastructure to the community or 
other nonprofit organizations. Financial statements of a stratified random sample of 835 registered 
charities were extracted from the Register and analysed.15 The sample was stratified by the sector 
chosen by the charities from a list of twelve different sectors when they file their financial 
statements.16 Approximately half of the sample had expenditure of less than NZ$40,000 (425) and the 
                                                          
15  The register included 21,156 organizations that had filed financial reports in November 2011, the date at 
which the register was accessed. Financial reports were progressively downloaded between November 2011 
and January 2012. 
16  Johns Hopkins University lists 12 different sectoral groupings for nonprofit organizations: culture and 
recreation, education and research, health, social services, environment, development and housing, civil 
rights, advocacy and politics, grant-making, philanthropic intermediaries and volunteerism promotion, 
international, religion, business and professional associations, unions and “not elsewhere classified” 
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remainder (410) had expenditure greater than NZ$40,000 but less than NZ$2,000,000.17 The 
population from which this sample was drawn comprised 95.96% of the total register. We excluded 
large charities that comprise the balance due to a potential bias towards a business orientation.  
Financial data filed by the charities in a pro-forma document was downloaded, along with 
their annual financial statements which they were required to file contemporaneously. These latter 
were separately entered into a spreadsheet to check the validity of the pro-forma data filed with the 
regulator. This was undertaken due to the known errors in this and similar filings with regulators and 
to enable analysis of the variety present in the reports filed (Cordery & Patel, 2011; Crawford, Morgan, 
Cordery, & Breen, 2014; Keating & Frumkin, 2003). These organizations’ revenues and expenditures 
were converted to ratios and analysed to enable comparisons.18 Charities with zero total revenue were 
omitted from the analysis, resulting finally in a data set of 803 charities.  
We then used cluster analysis on the data set of 803 charities. Cluster analysis (specifically K-means 
cluster analysis) was used because we were looking for “types” or clusters of charities which met most, 
if not all, of the following criteria: 
1. The different “types” generated by the statistical algorithm should, as much as possible be very 
different in terms of their dominant source(s) of revenue. That is, the different “types” defined 
by the statistical algorithm should provide groupings which are intuitively and meaningfully 
different, capturing the data’s natural structure (Tan, Steinbach, & Kumar, 2004).  
2. Individual charities should, as much as possible, clearly belong to only one “type”.  That is, the 
mean percent of each revenue source should be very different from one charity “type” to 
another. 
3. The different “types” of charities should each be very homogeneous.  That is, the percent 
revenues should not vary a lot within each type. 
                                                          
(Salamon & Anheier, 1992a, 1992b). Charities select their sector on their annual filing. These groupings were 
not useful to test the hypothesis as they did not separate out revenue flows and activities. 
17  These dollar ranges were chosen as they corresponded to proposed reporting requirements. The population 
of the ‘small’ (<$40,000) segment was 11,282 and the ‘medium’ (>40,000 and <2 million) was 9,019.  
18  Each revenue category was expressed as a percentage of total revenue. Expenditures were expressed as a 
percentage of total expenditure and so on.  
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4. The clustering algorithm should be reproducible.  That is, when the cluster definitions based 
on the original data set of 803 charities are used in other data sets of charities, the charity 
“types” thus defined should also be very different, meaningful and homogeneous. For this 
reason, a second data set, a simple random sample of 296 further registered charities was used 
to verify the clustering algorithm.   
K-means clustering is the most widely used clustering algorithm and assigns each case to one 
partitional cluster, rather than allowing over-lapping clusters nested or hierarchical sub-clusters (Tan 
et al., 2004). Further, K-means clustering is a complete clustering system rather than the partial 
clustering achieved by DBSCAN density-bound clustering algorithms (Tan et al., 2004). Nevertheless, 
K-means clustering has the limitation that the user chooses the number of clusters to be used. 
Therefore, we first used hierarchical clustering to determine the best cluster number for the 803 
charities in the file. It suggested four clusters. K-means clustering was then performed on the 803 
charities with 4, 5, and 6 clusters. The four cluster model included two clusters with 300 or more 
members, while the five cluster model included only one large (300+) cluster. The six cluster model 
included one cluster with only 5 members, which would not allow for rigorous descriptive statistics. 
We therefore chose the five cluster model as the most useful for analysis. 
We next extended the description of the five clusters beyond the revenue ratios, to include an 
analysis of expenditure, liabilities and assets. This allowed us to further describe our clusters and 
assess their suitability; finally, we validated the cluster algorithm (as recommended by Tan et al. 2004) 
with a second random sample of 296 charities (140 small and 156 medium-sized). For each of these 
296 charities, the distance from the centroid of each cluster (from the analysis of the 803) was 
calculated, and the charity was assigned to the cluster whose centroid was closest. We then examined 
the data from this second data set to determine if they had a similar distribution of revenues, 
expenditures, assets and liabilities to the clusters in the first data set, and to examine whether the 
clusters in the second data set were distinct and homogeneous. We used one-way ANOVA and Post 
Hoc tests to see how the percent revenue means and standard deviations in this new sample met or 
did not meet our criteria for an adequate categorization of charities, and how the clusters in this 
second set resembled, or not, the clusters from the exploratory cluster analysis on the first set. The 
results of the initial clustering and validation follow. 
 
5.3 Development and Description of Clusters 
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In this sub-section we present the results from the clustering. The validation of the findings is 
discussed in the next section. Table 2 provides the overall results of the one-way ANOVA for the 
clusters based on revenue sources. As expected, since the clusters were defined by revenue sources, 
for all revenue sources the mean percents were significantly different by cluster. However, we were 
interested in how well the group means separated out by revenue source(s). We therefore examined 
the results of the Post Hoc tests (Tukey’s) to see whether the clusters fell into distinct groupings with 
respect to the revenue types.  For example, from Table 2, we see that the revenue source 
“sponsorships” clearly separates the 5 clusters into two groups, which could be called high versus low 
levels of sponsorship, because there is no statistical overlap in the means. Considering all revenue 
sources, the Post Hoc tests indicate no more than one cluster overlapping for any comparison. This 
fits the requirements stated above to have group means that are very different, as well as small 
standard deviations within each cluster to establish a statistical difference. Thus we can conclude that 
each revenue type splits the file of charities into distinct groups of clusters. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The next question is whether a consideration of all the revenue types together defines 
meaningful distinct clusters. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the revenue sources 
by Revenue Cluster and provides names for each of these clusters. From Table 3, it can be seen that 
for each Revenue Source, one mean is clearly larger than the others (often several times larger). We 
can therefore say that the Revenue Clusters reflect different dominant revenue sources. Because of 
this, we have named the clusters according to their dominant revenue source. We called Cluster 1 the 
“Classic Charity” Cluster as 85.06% of its revenue is derived from public donations and 6.26% from 
goods and services – a total of 91.32% of income from these sources (SD=11.80). Further, Cluster 2 
was named “Service Providers” as 89.10% of their income also derived from these combined sources 
(SD=12.82), but there was a much lower percentage (16.48%) from public donations, with the majority 
of their revenue (72.42%) being derived from goods and services. The revenues of the cluster were 
not widely diversified, except for the Cluster 3 charities which we termed “Member Organizations” 
and which had more diverse revenue sources. It can be observed from Tables 4 and 5 (below) that, 
although the clusters were defined on the basis of revenue, there were statistically significant 
differences in mean expenditures and in mean assets and liabilities. They are as follows:  
 Cluster 1: Classic charities: receive the great majority of their income from public donations. They 
are differentiated from membership organizations and service providers, as they focus on 
charitable support, rather than members and services alone. They are second only to service 
18 
 
providers in their expenditure on staff and services.  In addition, classic charities have the most 
cash assets of all the charities identified in this taxonomy. 
 Cluster 2: Service providers: receive most funds for delivering goods and services for government 
and expend most of their funds on services and staffing. Service providers are most likely to have 
short term loans – these will include creditors, staff accruals, and short term leasing 
arrangements, however they also hold a large percentage of their assets in cash, especially when 
compared to the member-based, infrastructure and trusts/grantor  charities. 
 Cluster 3: Member organizations:  their main forms of income are from membership and 
sponsorship and, for the charities analysed, these were the main recipients of bequests (although 
it is not a large percentage of total income). In addition, these charities record the highest 
overhead expenditure of all the charity clusters and make the least amount of grants.  
 Cluster 4: Infrastructure providers: provide facilities, structures and systems to support and 
coordinate front-line service organizations so that they in turn can deliver their missions more 
effectively. For example, these might be accommodation for a service, a campsite or community 
hall. These charities receive the majority of their income from rents and their expenditure on 
financing confirms their difference from other clusters. They are the largest owners of Property, 
Plant and Equipment and are most likely to have loans from members and other sources.   
 Cluster 5: Trusts/Grantors: have the most short term investments and receive the majority of 
their funds from these investments. They also pay out the most grants and have low expenditure 
on other classifications such as staff and overheads. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
To achieve a visual representation of the distribution of the charities, we plotted the data 
using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS is a way of representing the distances or dissimilarities 
between cases into two- or three- dimensional space, as defined by the variables specified. For 
example, the MDS plot of the charities based on the revenue percent variables (Bequests, Goods and 
Services, Investment income, Membership, Public Donations, Rental, Sponsorship), considers how 
dissimilar the charities are from each other, based on the different values of these variables. In our 
case, a Euclidean metric was used (as was used in the cluster analysis). Once the charities data had 
been mapped (in eight revenue dimensions and viewed in two-dimensional space), they were labelled 
by their cluster. We could then determine visually whether or not the charities in the same cluster 
were close together with respect to these variables. The MDS plot of these variables identified by 
cluster is shown in Figure 1.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The MDS plot in Figure 1 separates out the clusters quite well in two-dimensional space. That 
is to say, the clusters as defined have quite different patterns of revenue. None of these clusters is far 
away from the others, but they are distinct. Table 3 clearly describes the differences in means between 
the Revenue Clusters. However, we also sought to ascertain whether there was a difference in other 
financial elements based on cluster type. The analysis of variance results in Table 4 show that the 
revenue-based clusters also have different means for the expenditure variables. While they are not as 
marked as the difference in the revenue variable means, it can be seen that the patterns of 
expenditure map to the Revenue Clusters. These differences are further elaborated on in the 
definitions of the clusters above. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations of charities’ assets and liabilities variables 
by Revenue Cluster. This also shows that there are differences in the clusters as they are defined 
(specifically in terms of investments in Trusts/grantors, Property, Plant and Equipment and Long-term 
borrowing by Infrastructure providers. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
5.4 Validation of the Revenue Clusters 
As noted above, it is good practice to validate the cluster algorithm with a second data set 
(Tan et al., 2004). This confirmatory set (296 different registered charities) was clustered according to 
the Revenue Clusters defined on the original data set of 803 charities (see Table 3 above). We found 
very similar patterns of revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities by cluster. For example, classic 
charities (Cluster 1) in the original 803 received 85.06% revenue from public/donations (see Table 3) 
and the similar cluster from the new 296 received 85.21% revenue from the same source (the highest 
of the clusters). Further, Table 3 shows that service providers (Cluster 2) in the original 803 received 
72.42% revenue from goods and services and the similar cluster from the new 296 charities received 
73.43% revenue from goods and services (again, the highest of all the clusters), while trusts/grantors 
(Cluster 5) in the original 803 received 92.20% revenue from investment and the similar cluster from 
the new 296 received 92.64% from investment. 
The same held true for expenditures in the confirmatory data set (of 296). Service providers 
(Cluster 2) in the original 803 expended 36.25% on services (see Table 4) and the similar cluster from 
the new 296 charities expended 34.95% on services. Further, Table 4 shows that 41.66% of 
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trusts/grantors’ (Cluster 5) expenditure in the original 803 was on grants and the similar cluster from 
the new 296 expended 42.60% on grants.  
With respect to assets and liabilities, service providers (Cluster 2) and classic charities (Cluster 
1) in the original 803 recorded 41.26% and 49.42% cash assets respectively (see Table 5) and the 
similar clusters from the new 296 charities recorded 41.41% and 37.45% in cash assets respectively. 
The mean for social services was almost identical; however, classic charities held slightly less in the 
simple random sample of 296 than the stratified sample of 803 charities. Further, Table 5 shows that 
in the original 803 infrastructure providers (Cluster 4) hold 65.81% of their assets in Property, Plant 
and & Equipment (PP&E) and the similar cluster from the new 296 held 45.29% in PP&E. Finally, 
trusts/grantors (Cluster 5) in the original 803 held 67.69% in investments (see Table 5) and the similar 
cluster from the new 296 charities held 65.70% in investments. 
This consistency in patterns of revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities between the two 
different data sets suggest that this method of grouping charities is robust and reflects a repeatable 
pattern in New Zealand charities. Further analysis of the charities within each cluster was undertaken 
to estimate the percentages within the population of regulated organizations. We used the second 
sample of 296 charities (used to validate the clustering, as discussed in section 5.2), which was a simple 
random sample of regulated charities in New Zealand. The standard 95% confidence interval for a 
proportion was used and is shown in Table 6. This data is now discussed. 
5.5 A schema for classifying organizations subject to public regulation 
From the regulation theory literature reviewed, we expect that the types of charities that 
would benefit most from regulation and which government would be most interested in regulating 
would be those that provide public goods and grow philanthropy. Governments would be most 
interested to ensure that these charities are eligible for their exemptions from income tax and that 
the tax credits that donors can claim are worthwhile. Charities providing public goods will be those 
that receive high levels of public donations (and therefore arise from market failure, as argued by 
Rose-Ackerman, 1986) and they will benefit from published financial statements (Gordon & 
Khumawala, 1999). These were identified by the cluster analysis as Cluster 1 (“Classic Charities”).  
There is also an argument that charities that are government funded to provide social services 
require regulatory monitoring (as Weisbrod, 1988 argues, these arise to reduce government failure). 
These were identified by the cluster analysis as Cluster 2 (“Service Providers”). Alternatively, 
government service purchasers have an intense interest in service providers and differentiated 
regulation could leave oversight of these charities to the principal. Indeed, Verbruggen et al  (2011) 
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believed a government funder would more closely monitor charities than a donor public. 
Nevertheless, there may be multiple government agencies funding a specific charity and therefore we 
believe that when government funds a charity regulator as well as service providers, it should 
empower that regulator to undertake monitoring on its behalf as this would achieve regulatory 
efficiency.   
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
As shown in Table 6, this research showed that Cluster 1 (“Classic Charities”) and Cluster 2 
(“Service Providers”) total only between 67.94% and 78.06% of all registered (regulated) charities (73 
+5.06%). On the other hand, the three other clusters (Cluster 3: “Member Organizations”; Cluster 4 
“Infrastructure Providers”; Cluster 5: “Trusts/grantors”) receive low levels of revenue from public 
donations and public funding of goods and services. These “types” have arisen due to contract failure 
and/or to increase social capital (as hypothesized by Ben-Ner, 1986; Bryce, 2005). Their main resource 
providers are more concentrated than the general public and they are likely to be legally empowered 
to monitor these charities (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). It therefore appears that government regulation 
of charities in clusters 3, 4 and 5 is a duplication of resources. In addition, we found that the regulator’s 
tight operating budget, increasing donation rebates, and government funding into the sector are 
juxtaposed against a rising number of public complaints about charities, as well as regulator audits, 
suggest declining public trust and confidence. The New Zealand case is an example of the need to find 
cost efficiencies, so that the regulator can focus on improving charity accountability. Further, as 
argued by Mayer and Wilson (2010) and implied by Palmer (2013), efficiencies in regulation will ease 
the burden of regulation on small charities (an argument also supported by public choice theory; 
Peltzman, 1976). 
We noted earlier that differentiated regulation has been used as a policy tool in some 
industries. In electricity regulation, consumer-owners monitor the prices and quality of their own 
electricity distribution business in the manner described by Ben-Ner (1986). In that example, 
differentiated regulation has reduced the cost of monitoring as the regulator can fully audit and 
respond to complaints about a smaller number of organizations (those that meet its brief) and leave 
other (legally empowered) stakeholders to monitor the organizations which are not required to be 
fully regulated. It can be expected that the stakeholders of charities in clusters 3, 4 and 5 would 
monitor them in any case, but when regulatory resources are duplicated, these stakeholders receive 
false comfort from believing government also actively regulates these charities.   
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Differentiated regulation could be useful when members predominate in a charity and they 
also enjoy the goods and services it provides. These members are unlikely to need a regulator in order 
to access financial and other data from charities which they fund (these would be Cluster 3: “Member 
Organizations”). When members fund and manage interdependent (mutual) nonprofit entities, they 
are legally able to demand financial reporting from these organizations (Hansmann, 1986). It has been 
argued that such stakeholder management will be of a higher quality than that provided by the 
regulator alone (Breen, 2013; Freeman, 1984; Yetman & Yetman, 2012) and this is underpinned by the 
empirical evidence from, for example, Cleveland and Krashinsky (2009). While a shortcoming of 
depending on member regulation may be that members may choose rational ignorance and fail to 
monitor; if members are unhappy with the charity’s management, they can exit by resigning and not 
paying their membership fees. As shown in Table 6, between 5% and 11.2% of registered charities are 
member organizations (8.1 + 3.11%). In line with Hansmann (1986) and Ben-Ner (1986), we argue that 
the members should already regulate these charities and that the rise of a public regulator has 
potentially reduced members’ effort with detrimental effects on public trust and confidence. 
In respect of two other clusters (4: “Infrastructure Providers and 5: “Trusts/grantors”), it is also 
apparent that donors and funders of goods and services are not the prime resource providers. 
Government’s regulatory effort is likely to have sent the wrong signal to stakeholders of entities which 
do not arise from market or government failure. Infrastructure providers represent 0.35%-5.85% 
(3.7% ± 2.15%) of the population and the trusts/grantors are represent 10.91%-19.29% (15.2% ± 
4.09%) of the population. They receive funds from rental and investments respectively and are 
managed in terms of their trust deeds. In respect of investment income, Kreander, Beattie and McPhail 
(2009) confirm that organizations with investment funds should be closely monitored by their boards. 
For infrastructure organizations, their boards and management should also monitor rental revenue. 
Combined with member organizations, infrastructure providers and trusts/grantors represent 
between 21.94% and 32.06% of the total population.  
6. Conclusion  
Public trust and confidence in charities has declined and yet significant resources continue to 
be committed to the sector (Slack & Leung-Wai, 2007). The extent of resources used by these agents 
has given rise to calls for regulation in the public interest (Ferguson, 2005; Gaskin, 1999). Yet, 
regulatory effort and monitoring is progressively resource-constrained. We recommend differentiated 
regulation as a way to increase regulatory efficiency by active monitoring of only the subset of charities 
which provide public goods and philanthropy. We also argue that it is probably efficient for 
23 
 
government to regulate its social services providers, but recognise that multiple-agent contracting 
requires more resources and a single regulator may bring efficiency to this scenario.  
We demonstrate differentiated regulation’s feasibility by analysis of data on registered 
charities in New Zealand to show that charities do fall into distinct types.  That is, despite the 
expectation that charities would have a portfolio of diverse funding (to ensure sustainability), most 
charities receive a majority of their revenues from a discrete number of resources. We found that 
around 27 percent of the organizations do not receive significant funding from either donations nor 
charitable goods and services delivery. Around 8 percent of the organizations are member-based and 
the remaining 19 percent of registrations are infrastructure providers and trusts/grantors. These 
groups could be eliminated from the focus of the regulator and hence enable the regulator to focus 
its slim resources on the remaining 73% of charities that require regulatory oversight.   
The population from which the sample was chosen covers 95.96 percent of the total number 
of registered charities in New Zealand and presents probably the biggest regulatory challenge due to 
their diversity (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). Their profile is similar to that in other countries, for example 
Canada (Phillips, 2013), England and Wales and Ireland (Breen, 2013) and the US (Mayer & Wilson, 
2010). Hence, we are unaware of specific contextual factors that would make these New Zealand 
charities markedly different from their counterparts in other Anglo-American countries at least. 
Therefore, this analysis of disclosure-based regulation of charities based on a rational of resource 
provision rather than size could be applied by both older regulators (for example US, England and 
Wales) and newer regulators. Certainly research in these areas to analyse the feasibility of such 
differentiation, combined with how to reduce any limitations of self-regulation, are welcomed. In 
particular, specific analysis of the financing reporting and auditing needs of the monitoring 
stakeholders, will be required. 
Refocusing regulatory effort to reflect differentiated regulation principles to reinstate the 
onus on members to monitor, could also reduce charities’ compliance costs. More importantly, this 
strategy would enable the regulator to re-focus its scarce resources and increase effort on those 
charities that receive a majority of their funds from donations and/or publicly-funded service 
provision. Within this, size-related exemptions could also continue to be utilised to further manage 
the cost-benefit trade-off. Following such a re-focus, the regulator would be better placed to achieve 
its aim to promote the public interest, and public trust and confidence in registered charities might 
increase, otherwise regulation is destined to be yet another expensive example of public choice 
failure.  
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Table 1: Comparison of general charities regulators, number of charities and costs as at April 20141 
Note 1: Information from Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission International charity regulators’ meeting downloaded from the internet 
http://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Pblctns/Rpts/IntReg/ACNC/ Publications/ Reports/InternationalReg.aspx?noleft=1 
Country & Regulator 
name 
# 
registered 
charities 
Direct Cost of 
regulator (local 
currency/ US$)  
Direct Cost (in US$) 
divided by # 
charities 
Filing requirements 
Australia (Australian 
Charities and Not-
for-profits 
Commission) 
60,000 
expected 
(1,643 
currently) 
AU$14m 
US$12.8m) 
US$213 ( per 
expected number) 
US$7,790 per 
current registrations 
From 2014/5 charities with annual revenue of >AU$250,000 must file 
financial statements along with their other information. Religious 
charities are exempt from registering. However, the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-Profits Commission (Repeal) (No 1) Bill 2014 plans to 
disestablish the regulator.  
Canada (Canada 
Revenue Agency) 
86,000 CAN$29.6m 
(US$27.06m) 
US$315 All charities must register for charitable status and file financial 
statements and other information (Crawford et al., 2014). 
England and Wales 
(Charity Commission 
for England and 
Wales) 
165,000 £20m 
(US$32.4m) 
US$196 Most charities must register (unless excepted due to having e.g. 
<£5,000 in income), charities that are regulated in other ways are 
exempted. Otherwise, if a charity’s income is <£25,000 in the year, they 
must file financial statements (Morgan, 2013).   
Ireland (Charities 
Regulatory 
Authority) 
8,200 
expected (0 
currently) 
€1m 
(US$1.29m) 
US$161 ( per 
expected number) 
All charities must register for charitable status – however due to the 
very recent establishment, education charities are currently exempted.  
Registered charities must file financial statements and other 
information.2 
New Zealand (was 
Charities 
Commission, now 
Charities Services) 
27,000 NZ$6.3m 
(US$5.18m) 
US$192 All charities must register to receive benefits. They must also file 
financial statements and other information. New cash and accrual 
accounting standards are applicable from 1 April 2015 (Crawford et al., 
2014). 
Scotland (Office of 
the Scottish Charity 
Regulator) 
23,800 £3.05m 
(US$4.94m)) 
US$208 All charities must register and file financial statements. Some 
designated religious charities are more lightly regulated under the Act 
(Morgan, 2013). 
Singapore 
(Singapore 
Commissioner of 
Charities) 
2,130 SING$6.4m 
(US$5.07m) 
US$2,380 Registration is voluntary but necessary for “Institutions of a Public 
Character” (those wanting to issue tax-deductible donation receipts). 
All registered organizations must file financial statements. There are 
special requirements for those with expenditure >$500,000.3  
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Note 2: Information from the Charity Regulatory Authority downloaded from the internet https://www.charitiesregulatoryauthority.ie/Website/ 
CRA/CRAweb.nsf/ page/whatwedo-annualreporting-en 
Note 3: Information from the Singapore Commissioner of Charities downloaded from the internet https://www.charities.gov.sg/manage-your-
charity/Annual%20Submission/Pages/Annual%20Report.asp.
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Table 2: Results of ANOVA comparison of means by Revenue Cluster.    
Revenue Type Overall F statistic p-value Post Hoc result:  range of cluster means 
Public/ Donations 1218.174 0.000 4 groups, 1,1,0 overlap: 3.56%-85.06% 
Sponsorships 10.615 0.000 2 groups, no overlap; 0.00% - 4.99% 
Goods and services 991.920 0.000 3 groups, 1 overlapping: 1.20%-72.42% 
Bequests 9.581 0.000 2 groups: no overlap: 0.00%-3.80% 
Investments 2370.176 0.000 3 groups, no overlap: 3.09%-92.20% 
Gains/ Other 21.524 0.000 2 groups, no overlap; 1.28% - 12.94% 
Members 203.494 0.000 2 groups, no overlap: 0.42%- 41.70% 
Rental 1138.88 0.000 2 groups, no overlap: 0.74-73.43% 
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Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of charities’ revenue variables by Revenue Cluster 
 
 
Revenue Type 
Cluster 1 
(Classic 
Charity)  
N= 395 
Cluster 2 
(Service 
Provider)  
N= 200 
Cluster 3 ** 
(Member 
organization) 
N= 64 
Cluster 4 
(Infrastructure 
provider)  
N= 38 
Cluster 5 
(Trust/ 
grantor)  
N= 106 
Public / Donations 
(p = 0.000)* 
85.06%†† 
+ 14.98 
16.68% 
+ 16.55 
15.51% 
+ 15.68 
9.52% 
+ 15.40 
3.56%† 
+ 8.89 
Goods & services 
(p = 0.000) 
6.26% 
+ 10.44 
72.42%†† 
+ 19.51 
11.67% 
+ 13.10 
3.96% 
+ 8.86 
1.20%† 
+ 4.94 
Bequests 
(p = 0.000) 
0.14% 
+ 1.82 
0.0030%† 
+ 0.0411 
3.80%†† 
+ 15.77 
0.0042% 
+ 0.261 
0.04% 
+ 0.40 
Investments 
(p = 0.000) 
3.09%† 
+ 6.36 
3.50% 
+ 6.60 
8.07% 
+ 10.86 
9.33% 
+ 14.36 
92.20%†† 
+ 14.07 
Members 
(p = 0.000) 
2.13% 
+ 5.67 
3.65% 
+ 8.07 
41.70%†† 
+ 31.69 
0.42%† 
+ 2.48 
0.78% 
+ 3.65 
Rental 
(p = 0.000) 
1.54% 
+ 5.15 
0.99% 
+ 3.42 
1.33% 
+ 4.67 
73.43%†† 
+ 21.38 
0.74%† 
+ 4.29 
Sponsorship 
(p = 0.000) 
0.36% 
+ 2.05 
1.48% 
+ 5.70 
4.99%†† 
+ 16.70 
0.034% 
+ 0.21 
0.00%† 
+ 0.00 
Other *** 1.41% 1.28%† 12.94%†† 3.30% 1.48% 
(p = 0.000) + 4.84 + 4.64 + 28.73 +10.62 + 5.53 
*       The p-value is from the one-way ANOVA of each revenue source by cluster. 
**  The membership cluster was very diverse with many charities receiving significant percentage 
of their revenue from ‘other’ sources.  
***  Other includes revenue designated as “other”, “foreign exchange (and other asset 
revaluation) profits”, and “insurance claims”.  
†  Indicates the lowest mean for this variable  
††  Indicates the highest mean for this variable    
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Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations of charities’ expenditure variables by revenue cluster 
 
Expenditure 
 Type 
Cluster 1 
(Classic 
Charity)  
N= 394 
Cluster 2 
(Service 
Provider)  
N= 200 
Cluster 3 
(Member 
organization) 
N= 63 
Cluster 4 
(Infrastructure 
provider)  
N= 38 
Cluster 5 
(Trust/ 
grantor)  
N= 106 
Financing** 
(p = 0.017)* 
1.70% 
+ 9.98 
0.66% 
+ 2.23 
0.17%† 
+ 0.47 
5.71%†† 
+ 14.24 
1.77% 
+ 11.69 
Fundraising 
(p = 0.000) 
5.70%†† 
+ 15.41 
0.93% 
+ 3.51 
3.01% 
+ 11.20 
0.50% 
+ 2.70 
0.21%† 
+ 2.02 
Grants 
(p = 0.000) 
12.73% 
+ 28.03 
6.17% 
+ 16.17 
5.78%† 
+ 18.86 
9.49% 
+ 21.63 
41.66%†† 
+ 42.79 
Overhead 
(p = 0.018) 
29.87% 
+ 29.66 
27.71% 
+ 24.22 
38.94%†† 
+ 31.38 
30.85% 
+ 26.39 
23.53%† 
+ 33.49 
Staff 
(p = 0.000) 
20.36%†† 
+ 29.32 
17.05% 
+ 25.68 
8.16% 
+ 16.03 
9.03% 
+ 20.17 
1.88%† 
+ 8.43 
Services 
(p = 0.000) 
16.06% 
+ 24.40 
36.25%†† 
+ 29.85 
25.76% 
+27.75 
12.67% 
+ 20.20 
8.22%† 
+ 22.42 
*  The p-value is from the one-way ANOVA of each expenditure variable by cluster. 
**  Financing expenditure is spending on interest and leases.   
†  Indicates the lowest mean for this variable  
††  Indicates the highest mean/s for this variable    
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Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of charities’ asset and liability variables by revenue cluster 
 
Asset and  
Liability 
 Type 
Cluster 1 
(Classic 
Charity)  
N= 394 
Cluster 2 
(Service 
Provider) 
N= 200 
Cluster 3 
(Member 
organization) 
N= 63 
Cluster 4 
(Infrastructure 
provider)  
N= 38 
Cluster 5 
(Trust/ 
grantor)  
 N= 106 
Assets 
Cash  
(p = 0.000)* 
49.42%†† 
+ 39.31 
41.26% 
+ 37.04 
34.58% 
+ 38.68 
11.82%† 
+ 25.78 
22.58% 
+ 35.42 
Short Term assets  
(p = 0.033) 
5.08% 
+ 14.82 
8.21%†† 
+ 18.32 
4.08% 
+ 13.56 
2.39%† 
+ 8.26 
3.41% 
+ 14.36 
Investments 
(p = 0.000) 
17.99% 
+ 29.53 
17.59%† 
+ 27.26 
36.76% 
+ 37.64 
17.61% 
+ 26.90 
67.69%†† 
+ 39.08 
Property, Plant &Equip  
(p = 0.000) 
21.05% 
+ 32.55 
28.56% 
+ 34.67 
18.83% 
+ 29.12 
65.81%†† 
+ 36.35 
1.47%† 
+ 7.98 
Liabilities 
Grants 
(p = 0.005) 
8.02%†† 
+ 24.27 
6.42% 
+ 19.88 
0.95%† 
+ 7.53 
2.31% 
+ 11.02 
1.24% 
+ 10.14 
Long-term Borrowing 
(p=0.000) 
6.05% 
+ 21.55 
7.24% 
+ 22.92 
3.96% 
+ 17.22 
25.38%†† 
+ 40.68 
2.80%† 
+ 16.50 
Member Loans 
(p = 0.044) 
0.27% 
+ 3.48 
0.47% 
+ 4.84 
0.00%† 
+ 0.0000 
2.93%†† 
+ 14.07 
1.81% 
+ 13.13 
Short Term Liabilities 
(p=0.001) 
29.86% 
+ 41.59 
33.75%†† 
+ 39.92 
33.82% 
+ 42.00 
27.07% 
+ 37.40 
13.96%† 
+ 33.60 
*  The p-value is from the one-way ANOVA of each expenditure variable by cluster.   
†  Indicates the lowest mean for this variable  
††  Indicates the highest mean/s for this variable    
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Table 6: Stakeholder-driven regulation model 
Cluster Main funder Secondary funders Type of regulation 
1. Classic charity  
34.1% + 5.4% 
Donations  Services, 
investments, 
members and 
rental. 
Publicly regulated due 
to majority of funding 
from donations. 
2. Service provider 
38.9% + 5.55% 
Funders of goods 
and services 
Donations, 
investments, 
members 
Publicly regulated due 
to government-funded 
services. 
3. Member organization 
8.1% + 3.11% 
Membership Services, sponsors, 
investments and 
donations 
Self-regulated by 
member-managers. 
(Differentiated) 
4. Infrastructure provider 
3.7% + 2.15% 
Rental Investments and 
donations 
Self-regulated by 
trustees/management. 
(Differentiated) 
5. Trust/grantor  
15.2% + 4.09% 
Investments Donations and 
rental 
Self-regulated by 
trustees 
/management. 
(Differentiated) 
 
 
